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IT'S A BIRD, IT'S A PLANE, IT'’S JUS COGENS!
Essay by Anthony D’Amato*
Connecticut Journal of International Law, Vol.6, Fall 1990 No. 1, pp.1-6
Abstract: What we require—like the third bowl of soup in the story of the three bears—is a
theory of jus cogens that is Just Right. I do not know if such a theory is possible. I don't even
know if one is conceivable. But if someone conceives it, that person deserves the very next
International Oscar. To qualify for the award, the theory must answer the following questions:
(l) What is the utility of a norm of jus cogens (apart from its rhetorical value as a sort of exclamation
point)?
(2) How does a purported norm of jus cogens arise?
(3) Once one arises, how can international law change it or get rid of it?

[pg1**]If an International Oscar were awarded for the category of Best Norm, the winner by
acclamation would surely be jus cogens. Who has not succumbed to its rhetorical power? Who
can resist the attraction of a supernorm against which all ordinary norms of international law are
mere 97-pound weaklings?
To be sure, a critic may object that jus cogens has no substantive content; it is merely an
insubstantial image of a norm, lacking flesh and blood. Yet lack of content is far from disabling
for a protean supernorm. Indeed, the sheer ephemerality of jus cogens is an asset, enabling any
writer to christen any ordinary norm of his or her choice as a new jus cogens norm, thereby in
one stroke investing it with magical power. Nor does there appear to be any limit to the number
of [pg2] norms that a writer may promote to the status of supernorm. Consider the gaggle of
substantive norms, sharing in common their newly anointed jus cogens status, that have been
collected by Karen Parker and Lyn Beth Neylon in a recent article.FN1 These authors claim that
the right to life is a norm of jus cogens, as are the prohibitions against torture and apartheid.
Indeed, having attained this measure of momentum—faster than a speeding bullet—the authors
end by claiming that the entire body of human rights norms are norms of jus cogens.
However, Ms. Parker and Ms. Neylon, perhaps in a moment of weakness, admit that "not all
commentators agree that the whole of human rights law presently constitutes imperative rules of
jus cogens."FN2 They cite Rosalyn Higgis' observation that while treaties "undoubtedly contain
elements" that are peremptory, that fact alone does not lead to the view that all human rights are
jus cogens.FN3 I confess to breathing a sigh of relief when Professor Higgins' down-to-earth
comment was mentioned, for I had feared that the next step Ms. Parker and Ms. Neylon might
take would be the investiture of every single norm of international law—not just human rights
norms—with the heady status of jus cogens.FN4 If that had happened, we would have wound up
with something like the popular caricature of German Law: "that which is not expressly
prohibited is compulsory."
The long bull market in jus cogens stock began when Professor Grigory Tunkin proclaimed in
1974 that the Brezhnev doctrine, which he called "proletarian internationalism," is a norm of jus
cogens.FN5 Shares skyrocketed on all international exchanges when the World Court found in
the Nicaragua case that the international prohibition on the use of force was "a conspicuous
example of a rule of international [pg3] law having the character of jus cogens."FN6 This

pronouncement should be taken in context—that of a kitchen-sink approach to the sources of
international law.FN7 In an expansive decision, the World Court found it just as easy to promote
an ordinary norm into an imperative norm as to create out of thin air an ordinary norm. The only
requirement for either of these transformative processes of legal legerdemain to be effected was
the garnering of a majority vote of the judges present at The Hague.
Demonstrating slightly greater restraint than the judges were the rapporteurs of the Third
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, who conceded that "not all
human rights norms are peremptory norms (jus cogens), but those in clauses (a) to (f) of this
section are, and an international agreement that violates them is void."FN8 As usual, neither the
rapporteurs of the Restatement nor the judges of the Nicaragua case give the reader the slightest
clue as to how they came to know that their favorite norms have become jus cogens norms.
What exactly is a norm of jus cogens? The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties explains
that "a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law."FN9 I can imagine a candidate case. Suppose a provision of a treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation permits either party to launch an unannounced
preemptive nuclear strike against the other side's civilian population centers. Such a norm—if
two nations would have the temerity and absurdity to include it in a treaty—would undoubtedly
conflict with some peremptory norm or other, and as a consequence would be regarded as void. I
join partisans of jus cogens in [pg4] applauding the wisdom of a preemptive rule to the effect
that if two nations seek the freedom to annihilate each other's population centers, they cannot
validly establish their right to do so by treaty. Any subsequent attempt to rely on the treaty to
justify such an act would surely fail to get a majority vote in any neutral court of competent
jurisdiction. By extension, of course, I am arguing that when a putative treaty provision becomes
so senseless that it is unimaginable that states would actually include it in a treaty (other
examples being an agreement to exchange slaves or the right to torture each other's diplomats),
then jus cogens theory snaps into action to make sure that such senselessness, should it occur,
would have no legal effect.
Nevertheless, at least one student of international law has expressed his dissatisfaction with
confining jus cogens to the task of obliterating provisions in treaties. In a recent book designed to
introduce students to the subject of international law, Professor Mark Janis confidently asserts
that jus cogens also can vanquish customary law.FN10 His version of the supernorm reminds us
of Pac-Man, swallowing up and stamping out any and all norms that stand in its way.
The implications of the claims of Professors Tunkin and Janis are disconcerting. Assume that
Professor Tunkin is correct that the Brezhnev Doctrine is a supernorm, and assume that President
Gorbachev decided to repeal it. Suppose he wants to announce—as indeed he has already more
or less announced in the wake of Afghanistan—that the Soviet Union will no longer necessarily
intervene militarily in every socialist nation that has a democratic-capitalist revolution. Would
international jus cogens scholars object that it is illegal for Gorbachev to retract the Brezhnev
Doctrine? He is after all a mere mortal who dares to divest a supernorm of its power. What good
is a supernorm if a head of state can retract it at will? Thus, international scholars who champion
the cause of jus cogens might have to assert that the Soviet Union be compelled, as a matter of
the Brezhnev Doctrine's peremptory force in international law, to intervene militarily in other

states in order to preserve proletarian internationalism. What would Professor Tunkin himself
say? Perhaps as the one who bestowed jus cogens status on the Brezhnev Doctrine, he is the only
one who is entitled to revoke it.
Professor Tunkin may indeed have anticipated the day when he might be called upon to revoke
the jus cogens status of the Brezhnev [pg5] Doctrine when he wrote, in an earlier section of his
1974 book, that "[i]mperative principles obviously are not immutable, As all other principles and
norms of general international law, they may be modified by the agreement of states, by means
of treaty or custom."FN11 But he did not explain to us how, if a jus cogens norm invalidates
treaty provisions, a later treaty may modify the jus cogens norm itself. This would be like saying
that Superman is stronger than any criminal in Metropolis except for any particular criminal who
comes along who is in fact stronger than Superman.
In any event, it appears that Professor Janis was not quite so prudent as Professor Tunkin. When
Professor Janis converts a norm into a supernorm, even he as its author appears powerless to
demote it. For Professor Janis, a norm of jus cogens "is a sort of international law that, once
ensconced, cannot be displaced by states, either in their treaties or in their practice."FN12 This is
at least a forthright position. Once you've created a supernorm, monster or not, you've got to live
with it. So, if Professor Janis were to include the Brezhnev Doctrine in his list of supernorms (a
purely hypothetical case, of course, designed only to test his logic), he would have to disagree
with Professor Tunkin and instead insist that the Soviet Union must continue to intervene
militarily in the affairs of other states.
What shall we do with the Pandora's Box approach to supernorms taken by Professor Janis?
Can't we find a little weakness in it? Isn't there some kryptonite that will sap the powers of these
invincible supernorms? The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties made an attempt along
these lines. It provides that a norm of jus cogens "can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character."FN13 At least this introduces a second,
competing Pac-Man—one supernorm can be swallowed by a subsequent one. But the drafters of
the Convention failed to tell us how such a subsequent norm can itself arise. Perhaps that is no
serious omission; after all, they did not tell us how the initial peremptory norm arose, so they
should not be faulted for failure to reveal the origins of subsequent norms. But conceding that
much to the drafters of the Vienna Convention, would it not be the case that as soon as one of
their subsequent peremptory norms starts to arise and attempts to "modify" a previous
supernorm, the existing supernorm will do a reverse flip and stomp out the [pg6] subsequent
norm? After all, it is only normal to expect that any established supernorm will be on the lookout
for incipient competitive supernorms, turn sharply upon them as soon as they get close, and rub
them out.
We seem to be left with two polar positions. On one side, represented by Professor Tunkin, is the
idea of a norm of jus cogens that can be modified by any subsequent norm, conventional or
customary. One the other extreme, represented by Professor Janis, is the idea of a norm of jus
cogens that cannot be modified by any subsequent norm. The polar opposites thus seem to
represent Too Cold and Too Hot. Professor Tunkin's view is Too Cold, because it says in effect
that a norm of jus cogens is exactly like any other norm; it is imperative so long as it remains in
place, but loses its imperativeness whenever it is modified or changed by any other subsequent

norm. Professor Janis' view is Too Hot, because once the supernorm arises, there is nothing any
group of states or group of persons can ever do to replace it or even whittle it down to size If the
wrong one gets invented, watch out! (And since we are talking about international law, there will
be no safe haven in which to obtain asylum against the supernorm).
What we require—like the third bowl of soup in the story of the three bears—is a theory of jus
cogens that is Just Right. I do not know if such a theory is possible. I don't even know if one is
conceivable. But if someone conceives it, that person deserves the very next International Oscar.
To qualify for the award, the theory must answer the following questions:
(l) What is the utility of a norm of jus cogens (apart from its rhetorical value as a sort of
exclamation point)?
(2) How does a purported norm of jus cogens arise?
(3) Once one arises, how can international law change it or get rid of it?

With all that has been written about jus cogens, these would appear to be rather elementary
questions. I await their answers with keen interest, though I have no current plans to be measured
for evening clothes in expectation of the award ceremony.
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